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Abstract 
This paper explores the New Zealand Transport Agency Economic Evaluation 
Manual from the perspective of best practices in international literature. Drawing upon 
research from the international community and policy-focused bodies like the OECD, the 
paper seeks to improve the NZTA EEM’s quality by employing hedonic and revealed-
preference methods to create a more accurate tool to derive the value of certain transport 
investments.  The paper finds that the value of time in New Zealand is far too low, the 
discount regime improperly reflects the nature of such investments, cycling benefits are 
undervalued, and property values are not accounted for as well as they could be. The 
paper then applies these findings to the recently-completed Public Transport Spine Study 
in Wellington, New Zealand to illustrate the importance of accurate economic evaluation 
of transport investments.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 In modern political decision making cost-benefit analysis is the most common, 
most powerful, and most important tool employed to determine whether or not a public 
project should be executed. The cost-benefit methodology currently in use in New 
Zealand is in need of a review, particularly in the transport area. The transport methods 
stand out as having areas that need better research behind them if the best evidence is to 
reach the hands of decision makers. Whether it is fundamental issues that span disciplines 
like the discount rate, critical elements of transportation analysis like the value of time, or 
unique changes relative to individual transportation modes like cycling and driving, there 
are many issues that currently prevent cost benefit analysis in New Zealand from 
providing the best possible evidence.  
 Characteristic of these shortcomings is the Public Transport Spine Study recently 
released for Wellington, New Zealand: an ordinary case where a cost-benefit analysis was 
produced to analyze an engineering study according to the methods of the New Zealand 
Transport Agency Economic Evaluation Manual (NZTA EEM). This case illustrates 
what these issues can lead to – undervalued benefits, costs and dissonant values between 
modes. Despite this, the study contributes to the study of Wellington’s transport context – 
particularly relative to the costs of construction and the engineering challenges faced by 
each mode. However, the conclusions of the report have important implications for 
Wellington’s public transport infrastructure, and those conclusions are built upon faulty 
foundations.  
 This paper examines 3 aspects of cost-benefit analysis. Firstly, the NZTA EEM is 
dissected relative to six challenges this paper perceives: discounting practice, value of time 
determination, cycling safety and health benefits, employing land values as a confirming 
value of benefits, excluding private automobile ownership costs from initial benefit 
calculations, and neglecting to determine the value of the community severance effect. 
This paper compares current methods in each of these categories to international best 
practice in order to determine what the difference between current practice and best 
practice may be. This results in a package of best practice methods that will then be 
applied later in the paper. 
 The second part of this paper explains these issues in the context of the Public 
Transport Spine Study. This requires a two-step process. In order to be sure of this 
paper’s conclusions, the Spine Study must be scrutinized if it is to serve as the foundation 
for conclusions. This is particularly true given that the study evaluates modal choices not 
currently extant to study within a New Zealand context, and so conclusions about cost-
benefit inputs must be scrutinized much the same way this paper examines the 
methodology used to create cost-benefit outputs. This paper restricts analysis to travel 
times anticipated given future projected car growth and ridership projections per mode. 
This is because these two factors are by far the most important for determining overall 
benefits of a given option; even more important in some ways than the cost benefit 
analysis methodology applied to them. 
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 Finally, the third portion takes the inputs, and then runs through the cost-benefit 
analysis practice put forth in each of the relevant areas, in order to provide an analysis of 
four separate possible scenarios: 
1. The existing benefits and costs determined by the Spine Study 
2. The benefits and costs determined using Spine Study travel times and ridership 
data given corrected costs. 
3. The benefits and costs determined using corrected travel times and ridership data, 
as well as corrected costs. 
4. The benefits and costs determined using corrected travel times and ridership data, 
as well as corrected costs presuming a flyover and 2nd Mount Victoria Tunnel are 
not constructed.  
Through the analysis of these four scenarios this paper can determine to what degree 
existing cost-benefit analysis is a problem and where corrections to that problem may be 
sought soonest.  
 This paper seeks to reduce the degree of error in New Zealand cost-benefit 
analysis, particularly for the transport sector. In this vein, the paper seeks better 
information for decision makers, better projects getting funded, better options for 
ratepayers, and better long-term outcomes for the country.  
Chapter II. Existing New Zealand Context, Recent 
Research, and Optimal CBA Methods 
Transport investment decisions lean heavily on cost-benefit analysis to determine 
their viability. In turn, these analyses depend heavily on the parameters employed to 
evaluate them. The paper identifies six areas where current New Zealand methodology 
does not conform with international literature: discounting; the value of time; cycling 
benefit calculation; property uplift; automobile ownership costs; and community 
severance. Each one deserves close attention, and improving the methodology used to 
calculate these components of cost-benefit analyses would improve the evidence provided 
to decisionmakers and ideally improve outcome attainment for transport investments. 
This improvement will result in better internalizing externalities and helping to seek a 
more balanced, realistic version of cost-benefit analysis. In doing so, these changes strike a 
compromise between the myriad needs of decisionmakers while attempting to remove 
political considerations from cost-benefit analysis whenever possible, replacing it with 
sound methods founded in international literature that can then be viewed through a 
political lens. The following explores each of the six areas with an eye towards the existing 
New Zealand context, pitting it alongside the best literature in the area.  
Section 2.01 The Discount Rate 
Discounting practice is easily described. It is a tool used to represent the value of a 
future dollar in today’s terms. The methods used to achieve this conflict are primarily 
divided into two camps. One originates in the private sector, financially-oriented 
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discounting, and primarily uses market rates of interest with a risk premium to discount 
future values. The second, social discounting, attempts to discount at the rate of preferred 
consumption, rather than the rate of private interest, to reflect the concept’s psychological 
underpinnings. 
 
 Discounting is a relatively recent concept in government, though it dates from far 
before in the investment world. After making an appearance in government analyses in 
the 1970s, the 1980s saw discounting rise to prominence (Sáez & Requena, 2007), 
revolutionizing the practice of cost-benefit investment analysis by incorporating the 
practical challenges imposed by the cost of capital and the inherent individualistic desire 
to consume now rather than later. This has resulted in a modern status quo where CBA 
influences every government investment in the developed world to an extent that the 
OECD notes “The discount rate is normally the most crucial factor in whether medium 
to long-term projects pass a cost-benefit analysis” (2007, p. 5). Given this fact, both the 
why and how of discounting need be examined when looking at medium-term 
investments, among which transportation fits quite well.  
 
 Various writers propose different explanations for discounting as a practice. Some 
see it employed to represent the quantifiable chance that the population intended to enjoy 
it will not be there, or the investment will not be there to serve them, due to some manner 
of catastrophe  (Feldstein, 1964; Rambaud & Torrecillas, 2005). Others see the social 
time preference to consume now rather than later as the primary focus  (De Rus & 
Nombela, 2007; Feldstein, 1964; Hope, 2008; OECD, 2007; Rambaud & Torrecillas, 
2005), while still more, including New Zealand, see the defining point of view as market 
rates of return layered upon the cost of capital  (Boardman, Moore, & Vining, 2010; 
Lally, 2012; New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010; OECD, 2007; Rambaud & 
Torrecillas, 2005). At a fundamental level, there is compelling reason behind each of 
these options. For the purpose of transport investment, the existing literature’s point of 
view on discount rate boils down to a few practical options: 
• Using a fixed discount rate based upon the cost of capital and market return. 
• Using a low, fixed discount rate that reflects respect for future generations’ needs.  
• Using declining discount rates that track the long-term social perception of value. 
• Refusing to discount at all, based on the responsibility to future generations. 
The current New Zealand Treasury guidance on transport investment discounting 
is six percent – just reviewed in July 2013 – due primarily to the logic of the first option 
above  (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010). Market return on investment is 
considered and strong arguments may be put forth that the cost of capital alone justifies 
the use of this method in government evaluation  (Lally, 2012). One of the key elements 
to consider, however, is the broad base of literature that recognizes such discount rates 
fail to perform adequately both in public and private arenas. This literature ranges from 
that dealing with forestry  (Hepburn & Koundouri, 2007; OECD, 2007), to that dealing 
with broader ecological issues  (Hepburn, Koundouri, Panopoulou, & Pantelidis, 2009; 
Hope, 2008; Rambaud & Torrecillas, 2005) and generalized public investment  (OECD, 
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2007; Rambaud & Torrecillas, 2005; Sáez & Requena, 2007). The key factor these works 
acknowledge is that such discount rates as envisioned currently do not take into account 
several important issues. 
 Getting to the source of these issues begins with uncertainty and aggregate 
preferences. Gollier (2002b) details that discount rates as currently employed don’t 
account for the uncertainty surrounding future growth, and thus “…the discount rate to 
be used for long-lasting investments should be a decreasing function of their duration. 
This is due to the negative effect of accumulating the per period growth risk in the long 
run” (p. 163). Further research of his bolsters this position with models that deal with 
other areas of discounting theory. He models the interaction of wealth effects and 
precautionary action (Gollier, 2002b) and aggregate time preferences given non-
heterogeneous rates of impatience among a population (Gollier & Zeckhauser, 2005) 
which separately lead to the same conclusion that fixed discount rates do not accurately 
reflect social time preference. These combined models lead from different avenues to the 
same conclusion that declining discount rates should be employed by any agency 
evaluating an investment. The conclusion that discount rates should be declining no 
matter what the rate is to begin with has an outsized influence on the outcome of cost-
benefit analysis, particularly in the long term. Rambaud (2005), OECD (2007), Hepburn 
(2007 & 2009), Boardman (2010), and Azfar (1999) all note these issues with a constant 
market-focused discount rate.  
 
 Weitzman (1998) further highlights the problems with the existing regime by 
pointing out practically that, “the logic of exponential discounting forces us to say that 
what we might otherwise conceptualize as monumental events ‘do not much matter’ 
when they occur in future centuries or millennia… Yet almost no one really feels this way 
about the distant future”(p. 201). His modeling both adds further ammunition to the 
conclusions posed by Gollier, and provides an additional conclusion that certainty-
equivalent social discount rates are the most appropriate rates to employ when looking at 
the distant future. By modelling future uncertainty about growth rates, Weitzman shows 
that, in fact, future growth rate uncertainty need also be accounted for when factoring 
risk into a cost-benefit analysis. Project risk is offset, or more than offset, by the 
fundamental risk of growth rate uncertainty. His modeling leads to the conclusion that 
the least limiting discount factor should be employed for any given evaluation (Weitzman, 
1998). The least limiting discount factor is the lowest one, particularly as you get further 
into the future. As a result, he finds that the lowest discount factor possible, and thus 
discount rate possible, need be employed. In the near future, the lowest possible discount 
rate is the certainty-equivalent discount rate. In the distant future, it is more likely to be 
some diminished portion of that rate. 
 
In sum, the discount rate currently employed by the NZTA EEM under option 
one is denying society a proper picture, and in turn possibly introducing a cost by 
selecting projects that are not optimal among projects being evaluated. This is 
particularly true in the transport space, where investments tend to be long lived.  
The second option, a low long-term discount rate as proposed in the Stern Review  
(Stern, 2006) for environmental purposes, offers value for intergenerational purposes. In 
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particular when applied to investments or impacts that aren’t necessarily consumption-
driven, and that will be felt long after the existing generation has passed, this method has 
high potential utility. That said, it is particularly unsuited to the evaluation of near-term 
government action due to its neglect of short-term project risk. This flaw is markedly 
similar to the existing regime’s flaw, but with the opposite outcome. It is because of these 
opposed strengths and weaknesses that some literature notes the possibility of applying 
different discount rates to different impacts  (Rambaud & Torrecillas, 2005) – for example 
discounting environmental impacts less than financial revenues. These possibilities are 
posed, and summarily declined due to the possibility of lending overwhelming effect to 
certain categories in evaluation. Sáez & Requena (2007) offer a particularly illuminating 
taxonomy of discounting regimes and the relative merits of each.  
Based on the understanding that a change is warranted due to these shortcomings, 
it is important to note that it is easy to eliminate the fourth discounting option – not 
discounting at all. As mentioned previously, the risk of the project or the population 
served being impacted by catastrophe, thus preventing the future use of any good, should 
set a baseline minimum for discounting. That minimum is quite low, and it resembles 
closely the second option.  
The combination of these strengths and weaknesses of options one, two, and four 
suggest that option three, a declining fixed (or hyperbolic) discount rate that applies to all 
government investments equally, is the optimal discounting scheme to employ  (Azfar, 
1999; Gollier & Zeckhauser, 2005; Gollier, 2002a, 2002b; OECD, 2007; Rambaud & 
Torrecillas, 2005; Sáez & Requena, 2007; Weitzman, 1998). Schemes based on this 
concept have already been adopted by the United Kingdom and France, with the United 
States scheme bearing a remarkable resemblance  (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2013; 
OECD, 2007; Rambaud & Torrecillas, 2005). A number of countries bear similar 
resemblance when noting the differential discount rates employed in different areas of 
government. The United States highlights this policy, with financially-oriented (Office of 
Management and Budget) government departments tending towards higher rates, and 
environmentally- or infrastructure-oriented (Environmental Protection 
Agency/Department Of Transportation) government departments tending towards lower 
rates  (OECD, 2007; Rambaud & Torrecillas, 2005). This ultimately is linked to the 
United States’ downward-sloping yield curve. While employing differential rates, these 
countries would be better served by a unified declining discounting scheme that was 
employed across the whole of government, whether hyperbolic or fixed, but declining.  
Due to this growing global consensus, and the state of affairs in New Zealand, 
adopting a similar program would yield benefits for the capability of NZTA and other 
New Zealand entities evaluating future projects, including transport investments. This is a 
revision already adopted in several OECD countries, highlighted by France and the UK. 
Below is the framework of their discounting schemes, set side by side with a pair of 
smoothed versions to combine the best of both in creating one for New Zealand.  
Table II-1  Existing International & Proposed NZ Discounting Schemes 
Year of Project UK France  NZ Social NZ Compromise 
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0 – 30 3.5% 4% 3% 4% 
31 – 75 3% 2% 2% 2.5% 
76 – 125 2.5% 2% 1.5% 2.25% 
126 – 200 2% 2% 1% 2% 
201 – 300 1.5% 2% 1% 1.5% 
301 – 1% 2% 1% 1% 
 
 This discounting scheme strikes a balance between the two existing discounting 
schemes, acknowledging lower annual growth rates per capita in New Zealand  (Institute 
for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2013) compared to both the United Kingdom and 
France, and smoothing together the existing schemes. This scheme offers advantages for 
reasons detailed above, but also because the focus shifts to the longer term as long-term 
interest rates reduce. This removes the focus on shorter-term analysis which can be more 
variable as it is affected by fluctuating interest rates, and shifts it to the long-term growth 
of the economy. This social discounting regime may be challenged either due to 
institutional inertia or pre-existing notions of the political implications of such a 
discounting regime. This paper does not concern itself with political issues, but does 
propose that a compromise discounting regime such as proposed above might provide a 
middle ground for social discounting and market rate discounting to settle upon. This 
regime uses short-term certainty-equivalent rates in the 30 year timespan and smoothed 
decline over time. This compromise reflects the different environment and solidifying 
consensus that declining CBA is appropriate. For the purposes of our evaluation, this 
paper uses the social discounting schemes.  
The above scheme yields two technical challenges that would need to be 
addressed by the EEM as well. Firstly, the period of evaluation should be extended 
beyond 10-30 years, to a minimum of 50 for any project – and ideally 100. Pragmatically, 
using the existing discount rate negates the value of any such evaluation – but this scheme 
would require closer attention to long-term trends.  
Secondly, due to the detachment of market rates and the social discount rate, it 
would be necessary to discount payments against project financing as well. Currently, that 
is not necessary because certainty in financing payments implies the interest rate and 
discount rate are the same due to the market basis, and therefore discounting nets out in 
the original value of the financing. This would not be the case if the discount rate and 
market rates are detached in the manner described, and thus requires such evaluation on 
a project level.  
It is worthy of note that costs should be discounted based on when the resource 
cost is incurred. It also serves a second purpose of ensuring interest rates are accounted 
for in an environment where the discount rate is detached from the market rate of 
interest. In this way, payments account for existing market interest rates, yet reflect the 
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overall net present value of the financing payment’s impact. This distribution of impact 
better reflects the potential for benefits, while implying that separate and severable all-of-
government considerations but be evaluated for how much debt is tolerable outside of the 
cost benefit analysis process.  
Section 2.02 The Value of Time 
The value of time for cost-benefit analysis is explained relatively easily. It is used 
to calculate the “cost” of a given trip in more than financial terms. This means, 
effectively, that a higher value of time equates to a more troublesome commute. This is 
why modes with co-benefits (public transport, which allows working and reading, or 
cycling which has health benefits) tend to have a lower value of time than driving, which 
is perceived to be the most problematic mode.  
  Quantifying the value of time (absolute time saved) and reliability (reduced 
variability) is one of the oldest challenges for cost benefit analysis when analyzing 
transportation investments. This is not just because valuing time is difficult due to its non-
economic nature, but also because times vary based upon both work purpose and travel 
mode. O’Fallon & Wallis (2012) examine the reasons behind this and the existing 
attitudes in New Zealand. Their research includes such insights as walking time is valued 
more as leisure, even when commuting, while driving is valued more like work. The 
NZTA distinguished between 9 separate values of time for different modal choices and 3 
separate types of travel for analysis (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010) until July 
2013, when it removed the modal choice distinctions. The variance in value between 
modes employed matched well with international literature. The values themselves for the 
three types of travel (during work hours, to and from work, and leisure/optional travel) on 
the other hand do not, except for leisure travel. Current New Zealand numbers indicate 
roughly $22/hour for travel during work hours, around $7.50/hour for commuting to 
and from work or leisure time travel (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010). This 
section explores the commuting value of time because the number of trips taken for 
commuting purposes dwarfs the number of trips taken during work hours. 
Various theoretical studies have posited that the value of time is in fact quite low, 
particularly in situations where “within-route” times are in consideration  (Hopkinson & 
Wardman, 1996). The evidence base for this is highlighted by studies built upon 
willingness-to-pay foundations such as Calfee & Winston (1998), who find through stated 
preference methods the value of time to be in the vicinity of USD$4/hr. Within a New 
Zealand context, a stated preference study of Auckland drivers found the value of time 
between $7.54 and $20.7 per hour depending on travel conditions (Hensher, 2001). This 
is not too far distant from the New Zealand EEM value of time of NZ$7.40/hr 
determined using similar stated preference methods. 
On the other hand, studies using revealed preference following toll payments to 
try and value these aspects tend to show much higher values of time, along with an even 
more noticeable increase in value of reliability as measured by reduced variance in travel 
times from day to day (Brownstone & Small, 2005; Lam & Small, 2001). Women in 
particular find reliability 40% more valuable than time  (Brownstone & Small, 2005). 
Keep in mind that reliability is calculated as the variability in travel time, which by and 
large is much smaller than overall commute time. As a result, the value of a single minute 
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of variability is far higher, but the magnitude of the overall effect of reliability on a 
commuter’s cost structure for commuting is much lower.  
The literature dissects the values relative to the prevailing wage and gross wage 
rate, leading to the conclusion that the value of travel time itself varies between 20% and 
100% of the prevailing wage, depending on congestion, with the strongest argument 
being for 72% and above when attempting to divine an average for a congested zone 
(Boardman et al., 2010; Lam & Small, 2001; Litman, 2013a). It is notable that O’Fallon 
& Wallis (2012) quote a conference paper as disproving the link between prevailing wage 
and travel time value. However, later work by the same author has in fact proved the 
link(Jara-Diaz & Guevara, 2003). In addition, the bulk of research indicates such a link 
does exist, and in fact wage-based tools are employed by the United States Department of 
Transportation, Canada and much of Europe. Given the large body of work supporting it 
and the mixed body of work from that author, the O’Fallon & Wallis, (2012) assertion 
must be disregarded.  
With a prevailing wage of NZD$31.90 and choosing 72% as a point to use, 
Wellington resembles closely the data Lam & Small's (2001) optimized model used as 
input data, though Lam and Small used US Dollars. Their sample indicated a prevailing 
wage of USD$31.69. This indicates a value of time, both for Lam and Small and for 
Wellington, in the vicinity of $22.87. Despite the different currencies, the values are for 
practical purposes the same. This high value is supported by recent research at the New 
Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation using hedonic price 
models that indicated a value for each minute of travel time to the central city of around 
NZD$40/hr spread out temporally over the span of ownership for a house (Pettit, 
Daglish, Saglam, De Roiste, & Law, 2013; Wannan, 2013). 1 
The value of reliability then layers upon this at 66% of the value of time for men, 
and 140% the value of time for women (Brownstone & Small, 2005; Lam & Small, 2001). 
Rather than conducting gender sampling an evaluation can instead use 100% of the value 
of time to calculate the value of reliability for cost-benefit analysis purposes. 
Employing these values as baseline, there are three major influencers needing 
consideration for the value of time indicated in the literature: 
• Purpose of travel – non-optional travel like commuting is burdensome and 
time is valued higher when computing costs than for optional driving.  
(Handy, Weston, & Mokhtarian, 2005; Litman, 2007) 
• Mode of travel – commuters pay substantially more to avoid driving than 
to avoid other modes, which implies that they find driving more expensive, 
or other modes offer more co-benefits.  (Elvik, 2000; Litman, 2007, 2009; 
Russell, 2012) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 This research indicated a home value increase of NZD$6700 for each minute of public 
transport travel time closer to Cuba Mall a home was. When accounting for estimated 
number of commuting minutes per year this amounts to around NZD$0.67 per minute 
value of time, or NZD$40.20 per hour.  
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• Reliability of travel – consistency of schedule, minimization of wait times 
and congestion.  (Handy et al., 2005; Lam & Small, 2001; Litman, 2009; 
Russell et al., 2011) 
The EEM adequately categorizes different modal choices and purposes of travel, 
with three categories of purpose (work, commute and other) and 10 categories of modal 
choice (driver and passenger for car/motorcycle, light freight, heavy freight, seated or 
standing bus, pedestrian and cyclist). As of July 2013, it has now eliminated the modal 
differences, however, introducing a new wrinkle to the EEM’s challenges. Even aside 
from this, the EEM’s problems in its treatment of travel time are still noticable.  
Incongruous differentials between purpose and modal split are difficult to justify in 
light of the existing literature. Particularly glaring is the differential between the roughly 
equal during work hours travel time values (which match closely with the value this paper 
determined above for commuting values) and the travel time values for getting to and 
from work, which are roughly equivalent to the values used to represent “all other” travel 
modes (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010). This does not conform with the findings 
of Handy (2005), Russell (2011,2012), Lam (2001), Litman (2009), or De Rus (2007). 
Though none of these specify a value of time for non-commute purposes, the consensus is 
clear that the value of time for commuting purposes is roughly equivalent to the values 
NZTA EEM specifies for at-work travel.  
Possible explanations for this incongruity are a presumed differential based on 
time being paid or business savings being prioritized in evaluations. However, rather than 
devaluing accurate measures of travel time’s value for commuting, the value for at-work 
travel should be increased above the commute baseline. As such, values for at-work 
should roughly equate to the value of time plus some representation of the cost to business 
for having their employees idled during that time, while commute time value should sync 
up with the above-determined value of time. The easiest way to represent this would be to 
add the prevailing wage atop the isolated commute costs. Optional travel can be valued at 
less than commute levels, but the current EEM level conforms with research that 
indicates lower values of time for costing optional travel. Further research is needed to 
determine both numbers for during work hours commute time and leisure travel. This is 
particularly true of leisure travel. With leisure travel it is possible per the work done by 
Handy (2005) that additional optional travel time may actually add value to an 
individual’s enjoyment, rather than being solely viewed as a cost, providing wide-ranging 
possibilities for values.  
An additional issue with the EEM is that the way it calculates congestion and 
bottleneck penalties. These calculations use a value far below even the travel time 
numbers denoted in the optional travel section of time values, roughly NZD$4 per 
veh/hr  (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010). It neglects the possibility of multiple 
passengers and establishes that value of time in congestion is worth far less than when 
travelling at speed. This disagrees both with stylized facts that driver frustration due to 
congestion would incur a higher cost than actually travelling towards the destination, and 
with stylized facts that regardless of whether travelling at speed or waiting in traffic, the 
commuter’s time is worth the same. Additionally, congestion value calculations focus on 
an incredibly complex section devoted to determining exactly how to quantify the vehicle 
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hours of congestion caused by intersections, exceeding roadway capacity, and bottlenecks 
in general. This method generates an artificially low value of congestion costs. This 
should be abandoned in favor of valuing congestion equally to travel time and doing so 
on a per-person rather than per-vehicle basis. Such an evaluation would create an 
underestimate as well, as frustration induces a perceived cost. However, it would be much 
more accurate to reality than the existing system. 
Layered atop this is the reality that reliability of transport is viewed, on average, as 
equally or more important to the value of travel time itself  (Brownstone & Small, 2005; 
Lam & Small, 2001). This is particularly true of women  (Lam & Small, 2001), who have 
a slight population advantage over men in New Zealand and elsewhere, thus raising the 
value of reliability  (World Bank, 2013). That said, reliability accounts for roughly one 
third the service quality variance compared to travel time value representing about two 
thirds of the variance value  (Brownstone & Small, 2005) when comparing express lanes 
to standard traffic patterns. To clarify, given a comparison between any two route 
choices, any differences between them in value of travel quality would be apportioned by 
the above ratio. This ratio may not hold when compared to the more regimented 
schedules of a train system, wherein reliability is highest, but it provides a useful indicator 
of what that higher value of reliability equates to in car-to-car comparisons or bus-to-train 
comparisons, at least. The higher value for time value and the higher multiple implied by 
the literature combine to raise the value of reliability using the EEM formulas by at least 
50%. 
There is one existing issue with the EEM formulas, which rely heavily on capacity 
and other engineering statistics, in that the formulas don’t explicitly demand that 
population increases and development changes be taken into account for future years. For 
example, due to the widely-acknowledged concept of induced demand lane expansions 
inspire development further down a given highway, usually inspiring in the medium term 
a higher capacity overuse than existed before (Goodwin, 1996). This should be accounted 
for in long-term analyses. Note that this is true of train systems as well, but no meaningful 
intraurban rail systems exist in Wellington (or even New Zealand) to introduce such an 
issue. 
Finally, the EEM also neglects to present different values for time when cycling or 
using any public or active transport mode. Cycling and public transport offer co-benefits 
in terms of health, decreased need of gym fees, productivity benefits, increased leisure 
reading time and other benefits detailed in Hopkinson & Wardman (1996), Russell 
(2012), Russell et al. (2011), and Sælensminde (2004). What this amounts to is a lower 
value of time for costing purposes when using public transport, and lower overall costs 
when cycling or walking, roughly half that used when travelling by car. This is 
represented in the older EEM as time is worth NZD$7.40 when commuting by car, and 
only NZD$4.80 by public transport (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010). However, 
this was revised in July 2013 to equal out in spite of the literature’s evidence to the 
contrary. The evaluation of this modal difference is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however it is a ripe topic for further primary research in New Zealand. For the purposes 
of our corrected costs, due to the research consensus on this matter this paper encourages 
further research to determine the value of the benefits accrued on a per hour basis for 
active and public transport, as well as psychosocial benefits for car travel, to then apply 
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against this value of time. This paper operates as if the status quo of unequal travel times 
is accurate – using a 64% multiplier (4.80 divided by 7.40) to acknowledging that public 
and active transport travel time is less of a nuisance than driving travel time.  
  
Section 2.03 Treatment of Cycling Benefits 
Carrying on from this challenge, cycling, as noted previously, has co-benefits in 
the health area. Valuation of these benefits is typically done on a per-km basis to 
conceptualize both the dangers of cycling in certain contexts (a cost), and the value of the 
health benefits accrued (a benefit). These are notably flawed in the New Zealand 
Transport Agency’s EEM.  
 Cycling trips have experienced a massive decline in New Zealand over recent 
decades, and evidence suggests this to be a result of transport policies that fail to 
adequately account for the needs of cyclists (Jakob, Craig, & Fisher, 2006). The 2010 
EEM makes strides to rectify this, but is hamstrung by several issues that distort the value 
of cycling in the eyes of evaluators. Currently, the methods focus too heavily on travel 
time, and neglect that safety is more important to cyclists than any other consideration  
(de Geus, De Bourdeaudhuij, Jannes, & Meeusen, 2007; Hopkinson & Wardman, 1996; 
Sælensminde, 2004). As a result, cost-benefit analyses of active transport undervalue the 
total social benefit available to society if planners create cycling routes that are both safe 
and fast, rather than just fast. Having already discussed the challenges implicit in the 
evaluation of the value of time when cycling, it is necessary to look at other aspects of the 
EEM’s treatment of cycling.  
 The absence of risk reduction from benefit consideration when investing in 
cycling-friendly infrastructure is a prominent, and surprising, oversight considering the 
overall vulnerability of cyclists compared to other commuters and the research 
prioritizing safety (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010). This is particularly strange in 
view of the fact that the only other project type that does not consider risk reduction is 
land use and parking investments, and the EEM lays out the point that “cycling and 
walking improvements should specifically address safety and personal security issues”  
(New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010).  
Higher road speed and proximity to traffic or parking alongside roads (due to the 
danger of opening doors) leads presumably to higher feelings of insecurity, which should 
be accounted for in the methodology. Measuring safety perception in the EEM is 
captured separately by willingness-to-pay methodology to capture all benefits. Currently, 
willingness-to-pay assigns a value of $1.30 per km for health benefits and $.05 per km for 
improved safety (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010), which does not comport with 
research indicating that security is more important than any other consideration to 
cyclists (de Geus et al., 2007; Sælensminde, 2004). 
Safety and risk reduction (security) is prioritized by cyclists above all other 
considerations, and its value can be as much as the value of travel time – implying that it 
is perceived as a requirement rather than an option to employ cycling as a commute 
mode (Elvik, 2000; Hopkinson & Wardman, 1996; Sælensminde, 2004). Despite this 
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lesser value, it is important to get this particular aspect of evaluation correct considering 
the top-of-mind nature in the mode choice decision. To represent this, Sælensminde 
(2004) notes that Nordic literature indicates a value of NOK 2/km (NZD$.44/km). This 
paper cannot access this literature as there is no English translation. However, based 
upon the research that indicates insecurity is even more important than the marginal 
travel time cost of cycling, it would seem that this value is somewhat conservative, and 
thus sensible to employ for low-speed areas until research on the value of insecurity can 
be conducted more extensively in New Zealand. 
Another alternative is to set the value of time ($22.87) equal to the value of 
insecurity, dividing by the travel speed of commuter cyclists (14km/hr) yielding a 
somewhat higher value of insecurity of NZD$1.63/km. This likely sets a fair upper bound 
for the value of insecurity. That said, given the context where insecurity is perceived to be 
the most prominent impediment to cycling according to international research, it is likely 
that this value would be more productive to employ to accurately represent the 
psychosocial and perceptual benefits of safety. Numbers closer to the upper bound should 
be adopted for high-speed areas (over 30km/h speed limit) and closer to the lower bound 
for low-speed areas (15km/hr and below).  
We can draw the conclusion that the EEM either neglects to separate out 
improved security, or fails to apply adequate value to the issue. Some would indicate this 
is the responsibility of the WTP surveys, which has some validity. The health benefits are 
positive externalities, and though they have higher economic value, they are intrinsically 
valued less by cyclists when they make the cycling decision. This is because these benefits 
are accrued primarily to the government-funded healthcare system as a positive 
externality, while the individual benefit represents very little of that excepting intangible 
costs like quality of life. Because of this, the values generated by WTP stated preference 
methodology for transport purposes are brought into question. The issue with the EEM’s 
treatment of cycling extends into the calculation of health benefits. The EEM poses: 
 
“Walking and cycling can have significant health benefits through increased exercise levels. However, this 
could be offset by an increased exposure to pollutants if the activity involves sharing road space” (p. 2-30). 
 
However, research shows that it is not cyclists who endure the highest levels of 
pollutant exposure, but in fact motorists and diesel bus passengers who experience the 
pollutants in an extended fashion (Kingham, Shrestha, Longley, & Salmond, 2011). 
Contrasting this, electric light rail is the only mode that is superior to cycling in terms of 
total pollutant exposure, though cyclists do experience higher peak intensities for 
extremely brief moments. The value of health benefits at $1.30 per km presumably 
includes a penalty for pollution exposure, but it is unknown to what extent. To compare, 
the World Health Organization HEAT (Health Economic Assessment Tool) indicates 
that an appropriate value for cycling per km would be $3.5/km using updated values of a 
statistical life from NZIER (2010)  (World Health Organization / Europe, 2013). Given 
the lack of transparency for the prior number and the global applicability of the HEAT 
tool, a value closer to the latter should be adopted. 
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 In sum, numerous changes are needed to reflect current literature in the way 
cycling is treated for cost-benefit analysis in New Zealand. The changes are summarized 
in Table II-2.  
 
Table II-2  Proposed Changes to Cycling Benefits 
Area of Change Existing Value New Value 
Value of 
Insecurity/Safety 
$.05/km $.44/k, to $1.63/km 
Value of health 
benefits 
$1.30/km $3.50/km 
 
One thing is made clear. Whatever individual benefits are created by cycling are currently 
more than offset by any insecurity disbenefits that exist. This is particularly true if one 
notes that existing benefits in total can be more than offset by the best practice value for 
insecurity alone. By removing the value of insecurity from play using segregated 
cycleways, much more accurate data on the value of cycling’s individual benefits could be 
generated, and it seems the government health system could accrue an abundance of 
potential health benefits were that the case. 
       Though these represent significant changes to bring the EEM up to the state of the 
art, for the purpose of later evaluating the Spine Study they have little effect excepting 
when cyclists transfer to public transport as their mode of choice. Because there are so 
few cyclists in Wellington, however, and the value of time benefits of switching to public 
transport may well outweigh the value of health benefits, this paper does not calculate 
this. That does not in any way minimize their importance when looking at cycling 
infrastructure in particular.  
Section 2.04 Patterns of Development and Transport-Inspired 
Value 
Patterns of development, and specifically property value influences, are 
inadequately handled in the EEM. It is well-known that transport influences property 
value. These value increase tend to “capitalize” the itemized benefits – in that they 
indicate what the sum of total individual benefits are worth to those who wish to use the 
transport. When they buy a house, or when they buy a business in the area what extra 
customer value they can expect. Currently, these are ignored as “double counting” in the 
EEM, but they offer the opportunity for good values to “check” that the benefits 
indicated by a cost-benefit analysis are sensible. 
 There are two major areas where the EEM neglects important aspects of transport 
development, and development patterns and land value changes are one of them. The 
second is private automobile costs. This paper first addresses development patterns. The 
EEM states that:  
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“Certain external impacts of activities, such as increased land values, may arise 
because of the improved level of service and accessibility to nearby areas. These 
impacts shall be excluded from the evaluation because including them would be 
double counting”  (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010, p. 2-6). 
 While widely accepted, problems with this point of view have become evident in 
recent years. Improved level of service and accessibility are tangibly different from the 
value intrinsic to the improvement of the area surrounding a station. For example higher 
foot traffic surrounding stations drives superior business opportunities. The superior 
business opportunities thusly drive better businesses, which in turn promote easy 
shopping for local residents. But extending further, anything from the design of any 
installed vehicle or the attractiveness of stations can affect land values. While a certain 
percentage of capitalized land value certainly represents typified benefits, these typical 
benefits do not account for the full scope of benefits. Improved travel time and reliability, 
for example, represent only a small percentage (.000001%) of the capitalized benefits 
potential predicted in the Spine Study.  
 Practitioner workshops have noted this contradiction in recent years  
(Transportation Economics Center, 2010), providing evidence that: 
“While great care should be taken to avoid double counting, recent evidence 
indicates that part of the increase in land value may be more than just the 
capitalized value of the transportation and accessibility benefits. It may include 
option value accrued by non-users of the transportation facility” (p. 18). 
 
 The most convincing argument that including some form of capitalized land 
value is not double counting comes from literature that details the difference in hedonic 
price effects between modes of transport. Meta-analysis of commuter services price effects 
finds that all else being equal, bus rapid transit stations have no significant effect on land 
values, while rail stations cause highly significant increases based on proximity  
(Debrezion, Pels, & Rietveld, 2007). But what this means is that, in effect, rail modes have 
intrinsic value uplift based on characteristics not captured in cost-benefit analysis or the 
EEM.  
 It is important to ensure that, particularly in densely-populated areas where 
properties are packed in tightly, land-value changes are accurately captured as the 
influence could be enormous. Perhaps Lewis-Workman & Brod, (1997) said it best when 
they noted: 
“The presence of transit contributes to the character and form of neighborhoods and 
creates opportunities whose value may not be fully captured by the intensity of use of the 
transit system” (p. 147). 
 It is that contribution to urban form that needs to be better captured in the EEM. 
To attribute the capitalized cost to benefits, it is important to state what attributes drive 
this value. When including choices like simplifying the car ownership decision, increasing 
option value, and allowing all valid transport decisions equal opportunity, the value is 
evident. Perhaps less evident are the minor differences in reliability and character, such as 
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visual character, quality of ride, and spaciousness, that lend light rail additional value 
over other mode choices. 
 In either case, there is broad consensus that there is intrinsic value to development 
surrounding rail (Bartholomew & Ewing, 2011; Duncan, 2010; Frank, 2004; Huang, 
1996; Ko, 2013). Property value uplift surrounding rail stations ranges from 2.61% 
increase per 250m closer to a station to up to 12% per 250m (Celik & Yankaya, 2006; 
Debrezion et al., 2007), but perhaps the most practicable value for corrective purposes is 
that within one quarter mile of any light rail station values are uplifted by 8.60% over 
properties outside a quarter mile, on average (Debrezion et al., 2007). 8.60% is also a 
highly conservative estimate, as it is based upon the 2.61% per 250m figure rather than 
12% per 250m.2 
As a result, applying this value in the EEM to any light rail station over and above 
the value of any Bus Rapid Transit station running on the same line seems sensible. It 
would be an appropriate way to handle the current exclusion of property value 
contribution to urban form and other factors which driven the economic difference. By 
using the most conservative figure this paper can both ensure that it is not overcorrecting 
based on a single aspect of analysis until similar research that accounts for all variables 
can be undertaken in New Zealand (or until light rail stations exist to analyze). If a light 
rail system’s benefits already exceed Bus Rapid Transit benefits by more than this 
amount, no additions should be incorporated. 
 This is not to discount the worries about double counting. To then incorporate 
this value into the total benefit calculations, private travel benefits detailed elsewhere 
should be subtracted (or added, in the case of disbenefits) from the total calculated 
capitalized value. This determines if additional benefits or disbenefits are yet unaccounted 
for. It can also be used as a verification tool to ensure benefits are being captured and not 
excessively estimated. This would essentially render land value uplift as a “correction 
check” to ensure that benefits are being adequately analyzed.  
 This method is not perfect, of course. In situations where there are high value 
differentials between the stations immediately surrounding buildings and those that are 
around ¼ mile away (such as if a station were placed on Courtenay place) it is not 
perfectly precise. Alternatively, primary research could be done in New Zealand to 
establish appropriate values for each mode.  
Section 2.05 Automobile Ownership Costs 
 Of the six issues this paper confronts, only one does not have extensive literature 
behind it. Existing cost-benefit analysis practice in the exploratory stages for the 
Economic Evaluation Manual leaves out an important component of transport – the fixed 
private costs of ownership for automobiles  (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010). This 
seems dissonant with the public transport options, wherein capital and operating costs are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 If data is available, you may also apply the 16.4% value uplift to commercial buildings 
and 4.8% value uplift to residential buildings predicted in the same study. This paper 
does both. 
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included, while variable costs alone are accounted for in the case of private vehicles in this 
initial stage.  
When attempting to capture the true total cost, and more importantly the 
economic efficiency, of transport options, this oversight is deeply damaging to the 
accuracy of such initial analyses. Though these do not represent direct costs to the 
government, when attempting to capture the economic efficiency of transport options it is 
important to formally recognize the distributed transport spending that is occurring as a 
result of these planning decisions, even if it is induced by the project at a societal level 
rather than a project level.  
Contrasting to the costs of parking, capital ownership and maintenance of private 
vehicles, another component should be captured- the positive psychosocial value (mental 
health value) of owning and using a car  (Ellaway, Macintyre, Hiscock, & Kearns, 2003). 
Though these two values offset, capturing each individually increases the precision of 
cost-benefit analyses for the purpose of economic efficiency. Each dollar represented as 
cost that is not offset by psychosocial benefits is an opportunity cost to the rest of the 
economy – particularly discretionary goods. 
 To capture this, rather than turning to the literature, existing New Zealand data 
offers ample information about costing out ownership of a vehicle thanks to tax 
necessities. The Economic Evaluation Manual already calculates average car ownership 
costs on a per-km basis – pegged at 99.9 cents. Complimenting this, the Ministry of 
Transport calculates the average mileage driven per light vehicle at 12242km annually. 
As a result, each car owned incurs an average of $12,222 in costs to its owner for fixed 
and variable costs. This number captures the price of registration, licensing, road user 
charges, depreciation, petrol, and maintenance. Atop this is layered the EEM resource 
cost indicated for parking of $11.40 per trip. This includes both the cost to user of around 
$4 and the cost to society of providing those parks. Finally, adding atop the $.10 per km 
of environmental costs leads to a complete picture of the costs of private vehicle travel. 
Incorporating these are both important elements to include in any preliminary cost-
benefit analyses, particularly when modal shifts drive changes in the level of car 
ownership.  
It would be useful to include a psychosocial benefits calculation, but among the 
available literature no attempts have been made to quantify the value of this benefit. It 
has been left out exclusively due to this inadequacy and it is suggested that further 
research should be undertaken to quantify the differential between psych treatment costs 
and option value for car owners and non-car owners.  
Section 2.06 The Community Severance (Barrier) Effect 
The community severance effect is the value of how much more difficult a project 
makes it to get around the area the project is built. If a road is laid in between two friends’ 
houses, or your house and work, a store, or a recreation area, this influences the 
perception of how easy the commute is, and leads to trips untaken, sales foregone, and 
social connections missed. Some countries have achieved costing of this issue, which New 
Zealand acknowledges in the EEM but has yet to cost out. 
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 The EEM’s cost-benefit analysis, specifically, lacks a methodology for 
capturing the value of the community severance effect. The EEM defines it and declares 
that it should be quantified, but fails to provide a methodology for converting the effect 
into dollar value outside of a limited scope. 
 The effect is defined in the EEM as “the dislocation and alienation a community 
feels as a result of roads which sever communities or hinder access. It includes the effect of 
traffic on security and mobility of people, particularly pedestrians and cyclists and the 
consequential effects on their movement patterns and interaction. (New Zealand 
Transport Agency, 2010). Additional definition is gleaned from the literature, which 
provides a more precise vision of the impacts implied – “The divisive effects of major 
roads result in fewer journeys on foot being made due to their increased duration or 
because of the poorer quality of the environment. [These are] considered ‘real severance’ 
and ‘perceived or psychological severance,’ respectively.” (Mindell & Karlsen, 2012). 
Beyond this, Mindell & Karlsen (2012) provide a history of the origination of the concept 
and the overall impacts that follow on from the reduced trips – reduced social contacts, 
poorer matching between transport mode preference and actual mode, lower longevity, 
reduced support networks, fewer friendships, lower organizational membership. All of 
these add up to a vast interconnected network of effects that deal primarily with the 
construction of social networks and conceptualization of ideal life.   
 Currently, the EEM aims to quantify the effects of community severance simply 
through the additional travel times that arise based on the re-routing of pedestrian and 
cycling traffic. This portion of the effect should definitely be included in any analysis. 
However, this fails to capture the full psychosocial, health and commercial impacts of the 
introduction of community barriers, as it does not capture trips not taken, or perceptive 
effects on neighborhoods surrounding roads. Two options appear for evaluating the cost 
of severance that do not include further use of land capitalization. 
 Sælensminde (2004) provides us with an estimate of the value of the barrier effect 
at approximately the value of pollution (at Norwegian prices) or, more importantly for 
our purposes, twice the value of noise disbenefit. Noise approximates the level of traffic 
and is tied both to engineered capacity and policy outcomes of congestion. A value of 
$480 NZD/pers/db/year already illustrates how strong this could be of an effect. 
However, this rule of thumb is inadequate for our purposes. A more useful value is a 
Canadian value estimated at approximately $1000-1500 per affected person per year 
(Litman, 2012). Calculating “affected” individuals presents a challenge. Though this 
paper can model work trips and food shopping, hobby shopping, travel or simply visiting 
friends would be impossible to model accurately. As such, determined affected persons is 
inadequate. 
 Alternatively, Litman (2012) provides a collection of literature relating to the 
barrier effect, zeroing in on two countries that have data on per car km values of 
severance. These include Canadian and Norwegian estimates, with the Norwegian ones 
coming from the same author, and come in at 8.7 Canadian cents per mile (5.4 per km) 
and 4-7 cents USD per km in Norway  (Rintoul, 1995; Sælensminde, 2004). This equates 
to a range of 4.95-8.65 New Zealand cents per km. 
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 Neither method is inherently more justifiable, though both are quick to calculate 
as the required data is already generated through the evaluation process. However, the 
per car km method is more likely to represent value when modal shifts happen. It also 
better represents the fact that even if an investment is made that divides a community, car 
traffic must increase to increase the barrier effect. Presumably government builds roads to 
suit traffic demands, present and future. If this is the case, car kilometers driven likely 
represents the severance effect well. Using the Norwegian value of 5.4 cents per km 
remains at the conservative end of the 4.95-8.65 range, which is preferred. The severance 
effect can be calculated from there. Increased car kilometers results in a negative effect, 
while decreased car kilometers results in a positive net effect. 3 
Section 2.07 Summary 
The changes in methods suggested above results in huge differences in the 
calculated values of both costs and benefits of various options, particularly in the case of 
changes to the discount rate. The end result is measured, objective cost-benefit analyses. 
That said, political considerations could drive the selection of parameters, as with any 
analysis tools. 
As a result, the optimal solution for non-political advisory entities, whether 
consultants, agencies or ministries, is to calculate both the old numbers as a “traditional” 
option available to those political entities that prefer it and the new values can be 
employed as an updated method for those who desire the most up-to-date research. Thus 
the political entities are left to make decisions based on their preferred methodology while 
the integrity of the advisory entities is maintained. 
For the purposes of the remainder of this paper, dealing with the Public Transport 
Spine Study, all but the treatment of cycling benefits is employed for analyzing the 
changes that occur as a result of using these updated methods.  
Chapter III. Spine Study Input Analysis 
 In order to put these methods into practice, realistic input data must be fed into 
cost benefit calculations in ways that accurately represent the effects anticipated. Due to 
interest in analyzing the Wellington Public Transport Spine Study, the study presents a 
logical first place to seek such data. However, there are noticeable oversights in the Public 
Transport Spine Study that must be remedied in order to accurately represent the relative 
value of each change. 
Section 3.01 The Travel Times 
 The Spine Study models travel times as being equivalent for Bus Rapid Transit 
and light rail at peak hours; distinctly unlikely given that the buses are expected to share 
traffic space through various portions of the route, particularly the most congested ones. 
It also notably neglects international research on ridership that indicates light rail would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It is worthy of note that each active transport trip untaken represents a disbenefit to the 
tune of 76 cents per kilometer, but this is likely due to double counting benefits detailed 
earlier in the cycling benefit section and thus must be excluded from this line item. 	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have higher ridership than Bus Rapid Transit. Finally, it errs in including a rail tunnel 
that, from an engineering and policy perspective, is wholly unnecessary4. As such, a 
combination of adjusting the existing numbers in the Spine Study and employing outside 
sources for travel times and ridership must be employed to properly account for these 
errors.  
 Travel times from the railway station to Kilbirnie differ based on a variety of 
factors, including exposure to traffic and requisite number of services to serve existing 
ridership. The base travel times to Kilbirnie of 24 minutes for the normal bus option, 13 
minutes for Bus Rapid Transit and light rail, excluding congestion delays (AECOM, 
2013; Google, 2013), are provided by a combination of using existing times detailed in 
the study and applying travel speeds detailed by (Litman, 2013b) to the planned route.  
 In addition to distance covered, existing congestion at the basin reserve must be 
accounted for. Given the doubling of capacity expected from the second Mt. Victoria 
tunnel, and the construction of a potential flyover, this delay may fall. However, Kilbirnie 
and Newtown are projected to be high-growth areas for the city. The potential for 
induced traffic of up to 40% of existing traffic is high given the existing congestion 
(Goodwin, 1996), the existing Mt. Victoria tunnel being already over capacity (NZTA, 
2012a), and congestion unmitigated expected to add 75% to travel times by 2021 (NZTA, 
2012b). Congestion around the Basin is also driven by Adelaide road traffic (35,000 
cars/day), which is expected to grow as well. Any congestion reduction achieved is likely 
to all but disappear by the end of any 30-year cost-benefit analysis, meaning the projects 
represent more of a band-aid than a long-term solution to the issue. The end result of this 
is the table below, with congestion times for each mode generated using methods in the 
Appendix: 
Table III-1 Congestion Times Through the Basin Reserve 
Congestion Times (minutes) through Basin - with SH1 flyover/duplicate tunnel 
Year Bus (Base Case) BRT Light Rail 
2013 10.25 10.25 10.25 
2014 11.00 11.00 11.00 
2015 11.75 11.75 11.75 
2016 12.50 12.50 12.50 
2017 13.25 13.25 13.25 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 The tunnel through Mt. Victoria makes little sense because a perfectly viable route for 
the light rail would be going up Constable street. Constable street not only has more than 
enough space for a light rail (though GWRC wrongly claims homes would need to be 
demolished), but is graded specifically for rail due to the fact that it was initially a conduit 
for the prior tram network. 
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2018 14.00 14.00 14.00 
2019 14.75 14.75 14.75 
2020 15.50 15.50 15.50 
2021 
 (Operational) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
2022 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2023 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2024 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2025 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2026 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2027 0.20 0.00 0.00 
2028 1.11 0.34 0.00 
2029 2.04 0.96 0.00 
2030 2.61 1.33 0.00 
2031 2.98 1.57 0.00 
2032 3.35 1.82 0.00 
2033 3.72 2.06 0.00 
2034 4.09 2.31 0.00 
2035 4.46 2.55 0.00 
2036 4.83 2.80 0.00 
2037 5.20 3.04 0.00 
2038 5.57 3.29 0.00 
2039 5.94 3.53 0.00 
2040 6.31 3.77 0.00 
2041 6.68 3.94 0.00 
2042 7.05 4.19 0.00 
2043 7.43 4.43 0.00 
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See Appendix A for assumptions and basis. 
 
Construction delay influences are difficult to predict. As such, this paper neglects 
to model them. The doubling of capacity as the new Mount Victoria tunnel comes on line 
is modeled as reducing the delay substantially initially, with the delay returning to growth 
thereafter. The rail options are penalized at 33% of the congested time of the standard 
bus, as it does not share any right-of-way fully with other vehicles. Ridership increases 
that remove vehicles from the roadway reduce congestion for all vehicles, so congestion 
trends lower when ridership growth outpaces population growth and induced demand 
increases. Additionally, Bus Rapid Transit is penalized at 66% of the congestion time 
given that it does not have any light waiting times, but still encounters general traffic 
through the Mt. Victoria tunnel.  
It is important to note that if the existing planned roading upgrades go forward 
alongside a light rail option, congestion times drop precipitously due to a massive supply 
of both car and public transport capacity (as reflected in the table above) given that rail 
cars can be run more frequently to accommodate ridership growth and the dual Mt. 
Victoria tunnels could accommodate nearly 40,000 cars a day. Additionally to these 
issues, travel time benefits accrued by non-users (other drivers) are also modeled through 
these congestion reductions. 
Section 3.02 The Ridership 
 The existing ridership modeled for the options in the Spine Study is interesting in 
two ways. It relies on revealed preference models built for the Greater Wellington region ( 
a region that includes no light rail) to model both bus and light rail options. On top of 
this, it models little in the way of modal shift in the base case, in spite of the fact that the 
councils collectively are aware of building congestion in the railway-to-airport corridor 
(AECOM, 2013; Wellington City Council, 2013), and population is expected to increase 
by 25% by 2041  (AECOM, 2013; United Nations, 2008). These two factors combined 
should lead to large increases, particularly given that Kilbirnie and Newtown are both 
high-growth areas.  
Both of these issues lead to a degree of doubt in the findings, but when compared 
with existing reviews of multiple installations of this type of transport infrastructure, that 
doubt is well-founded. Particularly notable is the Spine Study finding that Bus Rapid 
Transit increases ridership by roughly 8%, while light rail does not increase ridership at 
all. This paper does not adjust Bus Rapid Transit ridership, though information released 
about BRT indicates that installations struggle to meet ridership targets (Henry, Litman, 
Authority, & Austin, 2006; Henry, 2012)5.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Here we meet an interesting conundrum. Given the shortcomings in the modeling of 
light rail, shown on the next page, the light rail numbers must be corrected. That said, it 
is likely that the GWRC is better at modelling BRT, given it’s similarity to the existing 
context, than light rail. The question arises of whether or not to adjust the BRT numbers 
based on the international literature that suggests it would only raise ridership by 1-2% in 
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Tennyson (1989) shows, through a review of both existing modeling practice and 
existing installations of comparable bus and light rail systems, that light rail tends to 
exceed bus ridership by roughly 40%. In fact, he notes: 
“Because transit use is a function of travel time, fare, frequency of service, population, and 
density, increased transit use can not be attributed to rail transit when these other factors are 
improved. When these service conditions are equal, it is evident that rail transit is likely to attract 
from 34 percent to 43 percent more riders than will equivalent bus service. The data do not 
provide explanations for this phenomenon, but other studies and reports suggest that the clearly 
identifiable rail route; delineated stops that are often protected; more stable, safer, and more 
comfortable vehicles; freedom from fumes and excessive noise; and more generous vehicle 
dimensions may all be factors.” (Tennyson, 1989, p. 6) 
 
 The Spine Study anticipates 25% population increase along the transport spine, 
while anticipating a Public Transport demand increase of a mere 3% (AECOM, 2013). 
This minimal increase is out of synch with realistic predictions of public transport mode 
share. Given the additional capacity of light rail and the preference of commuters to use 
light rail even over BRT options (which themselves would offer more ridership than 
traditional buses) this population increase should be modeled while maintaining most of 
existing mode shares.  
 Due to these combined issues, modeling the ridership of light rail as having an 
increase over bus would seem an appropriate solution to correct for this neglect. It would 
likely capture a great deal of the oversight in the area of modal shift, as well as capturing 
the differential between BRT and light rail that is qualitative in nature. For a short term 
basis, Henry et al. (2006) note that over a 7-year span, North American New Start light 
rail installations saw ridership increases of approximately 16%, which extrapolates out to 
about 68% increase over 30 years, while bus-only installations funded through the same 
program saw increases of around 1.7%. It is likely that this growth pace would not be 
sustained, however, because some of it represents early decisions to change residential 
choices to enable use of the light rail line. Tennyson (1989) provides numbers that 
indicate in the longest of terms the increase should be around 40%. As a result, using 
ridership numbers that increase by 14.3% in the first seven years, tapering off to around 
40% total increase over bus options 30 years out, seems an adequate solution.  
It is worth noting here that while these numbers seem large, there is massive 
unmet demand in parts of Wellington, including nearly 18% of Newtown residents (and 
even 22% of Churton Park residents further out) along the spine who would prefer to 
commute by public transport, but are not served adequately (Betanzo, 2013). Given this, 
16% increase is not unrealistic over a short time. Given light rail’s ability to attract riders 
and the compounding nature of these increases, over 30 years 40% is also not 
unreasonable. Applying this modifier is a “minimum” solution that solves a relatively 
simple oversight without excessively modifying of a GWRC model that likely is quite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the first 7 years, or add a premium on to the international numbers suggested by the 
literature for light rail. In terms of taking a do-minimum approach, it would seem that the 
best option is to leave the numbers unadjusted for BRT. This may result in a slight 
overestimation of the value of BRT benefits. 
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good at predicting bus ridership. This yields a 2041 AM peak ridership number of 
48,506.  
Given the existing population of the mesh blocks in the catchment within 400m of 
the transport spine of 37269 (Statistics New Zealand, 2006a) and the predicted bus 
ridership of around 36000, the ridership of 48,506 in 2041 matches well on a mode share 
basis with population of 48,449 within 400m of the line. It is worthy of note here that the 
increase of ridership in proportion to the catchment population (in fact exceeding 
catchment population) is expected, given that Lyall Bay, Miramar, and northern suburbs 
are all served by the light rail via park and ride or trains, and their influence must be 
considered when comparing the ridership numbers to the catchment population.  
Section 3.03 Properties Receiving Value Uplift 
  The properties that receive value uplift need to be determined. This is in order to 
value them and then apply the uplift in order to evaluate total benefits and marginal 
benefits between modes that are currently not represented. Any parcel within 400m of a 
station is flagged and the value is added to an aggregate number, which is then multiplied 
by the uplift percentage calculated in the Public Transport Spine Study for the base case 
and the numbers indicated by the growth patterns section for the improved case. The 
map of stations and parcels, with selected properties circled, is indicated below: 
 
Figure 1 – Properties affected by Value Uplift 
 (Map courtesy Richard Law - Victoria University of Wellington School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences) 
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 In order to remain accurate, only commercial and residential properties are added 
to this sum, as literature only exists to support uplift in those two categories of property. 
The total value of these properties in this area is $19.7 Billion. 
Section 3.04 Difference in Car Kilometers Travelled 
 A necessity to understand the private vehicle ownership costs is understanding the 
difference in car kilometers travelled. The differences in demand between options must 
come from alternative travel modes, either active transport or car. About 27% of 
Wellingtonians commute by active transport (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 
2011). Combined with the 20% who commute by public transport, modeling 50% of the 
shifts as car to light rail is not unreasonable. The reduction in car kilometers travelled, 
however, is likely to be dominated by shifts from those in Kilbirnie, Island Bay and 
additional commuters through the railway station. As such, given the distances between 5 
and 6 kilometers of the total route, it is not inappropriate to project shifts at the average 
Wellington commute of 5km  (Statistics New Zealand, 2006b). The New Zealand 
Household Travel Survey Data concurs with this amount, with an average in Wellington 
city of a 5.7km commute (Ministry Of Transport, 2013). It is important to account for the 
fact that many of these will involve some park and ride component to the trip – given that 
the terminus in Kilbirnie and the northern suburbs will be distant from a rider’s home. As 
such, this paper will model the distance saved as 4km. 
 By multiplying the total number of mode shifts to BRT or light rail by the 
percentage of car shifts, and then again by the average commute distance, total car km 
saved per AM or PM commute is generated. Multiplying this by two, then by the annual 
average working days - 228 (OECD, 2013a, 2013b) yields the total annual car kilometers 
saved. This is then multiplied by the values in the Economic Evaluation Manual for 
operating costs to yield car ownership and environmental costs saved versus the base case. 
Additionally, it is used in the calculation for community severance. 
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Chapter IV. Methodology 
Section 4.01 Congestion Times 
First and foremost among the corrections must be the way congestion times are 
calculated. The literature behind this is detailed in the Input Analysis section, but the 
equations used to generate this are detailed here. The congestion calculations are 
themselves taken from the Economic Evaluation Manual. 
 To model congestion, we could model the entire start to finish congestion value 
for a line, but it would instead be more valuable to focus on the congestion choke points. 
The most prominent of these along the spine would be the Basin Reserve. Existing 
congestion is 9.5 minutes at the Basin Reserve when travelling into town in the AM 
versus a trip in the midday, and the 2021 congestion 16.25 minutes as predicted by the 
NZTA, which leaves a linear 45 second annual increase in travel time as the base case for 
analysis. This paper will take these data points, presume zero congestion elsewhere in the 
network for this limited study, and use congestion calculation methods dictated by the 
Economic Evaluation Manual to arrive at how the Basin influences travel times.  
The existing number of vehicles per hour in the AM or PM peak is set at 4873 per 
Opus Consulting (2013a; 2013b) reports. This is then modeled against a capacity for the 
existing network of 4986 cars per hour, the 2021 throughput. Opus reports indicate that 
by that time most portions of critical Basin elements will be overcapacity, offering a low 
level of service. It is important to reiterate that this neglects capacity and congestion 
elsewhere in the network.  
 The base case number of cars through the Basin is then calculated based on 
population growth of approximately 1% per year, culminating with a 30% increase at 
2043. A calculation is done for each potential mode that subtracts half the total new 
riders of a given mode from this number (as half of new riders come from cars) to yield 
the number of cars through the Basin in a given instance of modal shift. 
 Induced demand from road works, due to the already popular nature of that route 
into the city, is anticipated to scale from 0% to 40% over the ten years following 
construction of the SH1 improvements. Due to this, the induced demand increases by 4% 
each year following 2021, capping out in 2031. This is applied as a multiplier to 40% of 
the existing traffic representing one direction of Mt. Victoria tunnel traffic. 
 Following this, a 1400 car increase in capacity is expected from the construction 
of a second Mt. Victoria tunnel. This is due to existing traffic being around 1400 cars per 
hour, and Opus analysis indicating that the tunnel is already over capacity. It bears 
noting that in their modeling, Opus considers a second tunnel to add 1600 cars per hour 
of capacity. For our analysis purposes, however, the data on the existing tunnel is 
prioritized over projections about an as-yet constructed one. 
Added atop this improvement, the diversion of 2/3 of traffic coming through the 
tunnel via the construction of a flyover is also projected. All of these are added together to 
yield a ratio that determines the total percentage of capacity utilized in the Basin reserve.  
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 The final equation appears below: 
Equation 1 – Use Ratio 
 
This output is then adjusted to determine the net congestion delay by subtracting .7 
(representing the 70% of free capacity use indicated in the literature), then dividing the 
remainder by .3 (representing the portion of capacity that generates congestion) and 
multiplying by the existing congestion delay. This is represented by the below equation: 
  
Equation 2 – Congestion Parameters 
 
The calculation is then executed on each modal option by using the appropriately 
adjusted base value of Traffic. For the version without the SH1 improvements, the 
modifications for the flyover and the second tunnel are excluded.  
 The only exception to these calculations is that individual congestion measures are 
capped at 20 minutes as that level of congestion would inspire modal shift to a massive 
degree presuming uncongested routes. This presumption implies that GWRC would step 
in with more buses through the Mt. Victoria bus tunnel. Additionally, many would divert 
around Oriental Bay and even, in convenient cases, up Happy Valley.  
 It is worthy of note that this is an exceedingly generous view on congestion due to 
the fact that the additional capacity in the Mt. Victoria Tunnel is evaluated as adding to 
the Basin’s total capacity, when in reality bottlenecks will still exist within the Basin itself. 
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Section 4.02 Travel Time Savings 
 Firstly the travel times are generated for the base case by adding the speed of 
mode predicted in the Spine Study to the predicted congestion. These result in total travel 
time. For non-base case scenarios, the difference between the travel time of that mode 
and the base case is multiplied by the value of time to create time saved for public 
transport riders. The following equation is applied: 
Equation 3 – Total Time Savings 
 
 The travel time savings per rider then must be applied to the number of existing 
bus riders and those transferring from other modes independently. This paper presumes 
existing bus riders have time savings represented by:  
Equation 4 – Time Savings Per Rider 
 
 The more challenging issue is travel time savings for new riders to the mode. 
Presumably some proportion of them are coming from cars, some coming from other 
public transport routes, and some coming from active transport. The challenge arises 
when trying to determine the value of travel time savings for active transport. Less 
research comparably has been done on travel times for preexisting reports. As a result, 
raw data must be used to source travel times for active transport.  
Recent research indicates that 30 minutes or less is the ideal commute time for 
active modes. Presumably, those who already commute via active transport who have a 
15 minute or less walking commute would not bother to pay for a trip on a public 
transport mode(Ministry Of Transport, 2013b). As a result, a roughly 22.5 minute travel 
time would represent the midpoint between the two, and a realistic estimation for the 
average travel time for those changing from active to public transport.  
  Combining the travel time savings determined and the active transport savings 
results in the below equation for travel time savings. 
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Equation 5 – Net Travel Time Savings 
 
This equation, combined with the prior equation, yields the total time savings 
value for any given Peak Period (23% of any morning’s traffic) and the remaining 
uncongested time (27% of any morning’s traffic), as well as all active transport users. The 
outputs of these equations are summed, then multiplied by 228 (the number of workdays) 
and again by -2 to represent two peak periods per day as well as the fact that a negative is 
positive in this case. The result is then halved to represent that most ridership is likely to 
travel only half the distance of the Spine on average. This calculation is then repeated for 
each year of the analysis. 
Section 4.03 Automobile Ownership Costs 
 Unlike time savings and congestion, automobile ownership costs are easily 
calculated. As stated before, half of modal shifts are estimated to come from private 
automobiles. This number is likely conservative. These shifts are accompanied by 
estimates of the commute distance in vehicle (4km, 1km less than the regional average 
and 2km less than the spine length) saved. This is then multiplied by the cost of vehicle 
operation per kilometer and the cost of parking, both sourced from the Economic 
Evaluation Manual, is added atop this. This final number is multiplied by 2 commutes 
per day, multiplied by the number of workdays per year. The equation is seen below: 
Equation 6 -  Auto Ownership Savings 
  
This yields total saved costs for a given year based on commuter switching to the given 
mode from the base case. 
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Section 4.04 Community Severance 
 As community severance is very similar to automobile ownership costs in that it is 
computed on a per-km basis, the equation is quite similar:  
Equation 7 – Community Severance Costs(or Benefits) 
  
It is notable that this new value is quite small compared to the cost of operating a 
vehicle (roughly 5%). Additional New Zealand research would be useful to determine if 
this conservative case is true in New Zealand, where pedestrians are relatively less 
prioritized than even the United States. In most states in the United States, pedestrians 
have the right-of-way for safety reasons, whereas in New Zealand, they are secondary to 
vehicles. 
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Chapter V. Aggregate Results 
Section 5.01 Corrected Travel Times and International Costs 
This section consists of the benefits given corrected values for costs based on this paper’s 
review of literature, in addition to both corrected ridership and congestion analysis based 
on the same.  
Table V-1  Costs and Benefits (in Millions) with Corrected Data and Values 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 212 1,792 
Time Savings for Other Drivers 581 1,696 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 27 402 
Cost of Community Severance .581 8.6 
 
137 
 
1,138 
 
426 
 
1,967 
 
 
Total Benefits, Discounted 
 
Total benefits, Including other drivers 
(Discounted)  
Value of Property Uplift (in Millions of Dollars) 
There are two types of property value uplift calculations indicated by the literature. One 
that applies to all property, and one that applies separately to commercial and residential 
property. They result in slightly different values. Both only apply to residential and 
commercial property within 400m of light rail installations, while values are not impacted 
(or even negatively impacted) by Bus Rapid Transit installations. We do not calculate the 
negative impact because the degree of impact is statistically insignificant. 
Table V-2 Value of Property Uplift - Expected 
Type of 
Property 
8.6% for both Commercial and 
Residential Property 
16.4% Commercial, 4.8% 
Residential 
Commercial 1,696 2,361 
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Residential 
 
223 
 
Section 5.02 Corrected Travel Times and Current NZTA Costs 
This section consists of the benefits given existing values for costs based on the NZTA 
Economic Evaluation Manual, in addition to corrected ridership and congestion analysis 
based on the literature. The only difference corrected here that spans both areas is to 
calculate congestion costs on a per individual basis, as that is part of the “corrected” 
travel times. This is the most glaring error in the existing EEM, and as such correcting it 
is not problematic.  
Table V-3 Costs and Benefits (in Millions) with Corrected Data and Current Values 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 
 
28 -157 
Time Savings for Other Drivers 
 
198 578 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 
 
27 402 
Cost of Community Severance 
 
.581 8.6 
Total Benefits, Discounted 19 67 
Total benefits, Including other drivers 
(Discounted) 
 
70 
 
210 
   
Value of Property Uplift (in Millions of Dollars) 
There are two types of property value uplift calculations indicated by the Spine Study. 
One that applies to all property in a Bus Rapid Transit environment, and one that applies 
in a light rail environment. They result in slightly different values.  
Table V-4  Value of Property Uplift - Expected 
Type of Property 20% - BRT 25% - LIGHT RAIL 
Commercial 3,944 4,930 
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Residential   
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Section 5.03 Spine Study Travel Times and International Costs 
This section consists of the benefits given corrected values for costs based on this paper’s 
review of literature applied to the travel times given in the Spine Study. 
Table V-5  Costs and Benefits (in Millions) with Current Data and Corrected Values 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 
 
261 147 
Time Savings for Other Drivers 
 
n/a n/a 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 
 
40 14 
Cost of Community Severance 
 
.871 .305 
Total Benefits, Discounted 174 92 
Value of Property Uplift (in Millions of Dollars) 
There are two types of property value uplift calculations indicated by the literature. One 
that applies to all property, and one that applies separately to commercial and residential 
property. They result in slightly different values. Both only apply to residential and 
commercial property within 400m of light rail installations, while values are not impacted 
(or even negatively impacted) by Bus Rapid Transit installations. We do not calculate the 
negative impact because the degree of impact is statistically insignificant. 
Table V-6 Value of Property Uplift - Expected 
Type of 
Property 
8.6% for both Commercial and 
Residential Property 
16.4% Commercial, 4.8% 
Residential 
Commercial 2,361 
Residential 
1,696 
223 
 
Section 5.04 Existing Analysis 
The Existing Analysis indicated benefits of $95 million for BRT and benefits of $56 
million for light rail. The value uplift predicted in the NZTA cost section matches the 
values in the Spine Study.  
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Table V-7  Costs and Benefits (in Millions) with Current Data and Values 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 
 
n/a n/a 
Time Savings for Other Drivers 
 
n/a n/a 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 
 
n/a n/a 
Cost of Community Severance 
 
n/a n/a 
Total Benefits, Discounted 95 56 
Value of Property Uplift (in Millions of Dollars) 
There are two types of property value uplift calculations indicated by the Spine Study. 
One that applies to all property in a Bus Rapid Transit environment, and one that applies 
in a light rail environment. They result in slightly different values.  
Table V-8 Value of Property Uplift - Possible 
Type of Property 20% - BRT 25% - LIGHT RAIL 
Commercial 
Residential 
3,944 4,930 
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Chapter VI. Discussion 
These four (five including appendix C) different angles on the same project 
present a conclusive picture of one undeniable fact: the importance of assumptions used 
in to cost-benefit analysis cannot be overstated. These decisions have a vast influence on 
the type of projects recommended by cost-benefit ratios and the form they take. 
This is highlighted by the differential in benefits between the option with NZTA-
calculated costs and the one with corrected costs. However, perhaps a more interesting 
nuance is the difference between the options when major roading improvements are 
allocated funding along SH1. The tunnel duplication and flyover create benefits in a bus-
driven environment, but in the case of light rail, they could be rendered needless since 
light rail would remove many drivers from the road (Appendix C). These benefits, 
analyzed in the current system, would likely be underestimated by more than half.  
The reason for choosing light rail over BRT is quite simple. Building a BRT or 
light rail system, the flyover, and the second tunnel would lead to vast improvements in 
congestion times and substantial benefits to the tune of nearly NZD$426 million or 
NZD$1.5 Billion for light rail. That said, congestion times in a BRT environment return 
to a long, slow growth that return them to about half the congestion time of today by 
2043. This may seem minimal, but in consideration of the alternative, it seems costly.  
The attraction power of light rail actually outstrips population growth and can 
attract enough riders that congestion around the Basin Reserve declines steadily, and is 
eliminated completely by 2043. BRT still implies a congestion time of around 5 minutes 
around the flyover in 2043, while Light Rail reduces the congestion time to zero within 5-
10 years of opening.  
To indicate how this paper arrives at these conclusions, isolating each of the five 
changes to the EEM and the two changes to the Spine Study’s modeling is important to 
illustrate where the major differences lie. This represents each change on its own merits 
and gives measure to their influence. This is also useful since it suggests how one could 
target corrective efforts for the future. To evaluate each, this paper uses the option where 
both costs are corrected, but the flyover and Mt. Victoria tunnel duplication are both 
constructed. That change itself is then isolated for evaluation.  
Section 6.01 The Discount Rate 
Using the discounting scheme developed for New Zealand based on the consensus 
among scholars and OECD countries increases the values of benefits by significant 
amounts compared to existing NZTA practice – even with their recent update. The 
values nearly double. The increase differs between modes based on the temporal spread 
of benefits, as might be expected. This is reminiscent of the OECD report that notes 
“The discount rate is normally the most crucial factor in whether medium to long-term 
projects pass a cost-benefit analysis”  (2007, p. 6). 
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It is evident that a change in the discounting scheme has vast influence on 
transport decisionmaking, and decisionmaking throughout government if the guidance is 
applied on a whole-of-government rather than a departmental basis as the OECD 
suggests (OECD, 2007). Noting the challenges presented in financing projects and the 
general lack of benefits passed along to future users (who will pay those debts) due to 
existing discounting schemes, discounting adjustments may also recalibrate the social 
compact with the next generation, accurately reflecting that future generations may be 
willing to pay those debts, despite their increase in value, in exchange for similarly more 
substantive benefits.  
Section 6.02 The Value of Time 
 Using the updated values of time indicated by the literature, the value of time 
creates significant changes in the benefits indicated. When correcting travel time value 
alone, the BRT benefits increase by 4 times, while light rail benefits both flip sign – going 
from negative to positive – and increase by 10 times. These are different due to the 
proportion of benefits coming from cars compared to other modes. This is the most eye-
popping change, though when spread out over time it is somewhat less influential than 
the discount rate, as influences are heavily concentrated in the future due to population 
growth. The change of sign results from car to light rail transfers. Such transfers under 
the existing regime incurring a negative economic benefit – clearly unlikely to happen. 
Given the international literature on ridership having such a strong stance on the 
attractive power of rail, the differential values of travel time are justified in recognizing 
these values. 
 These changes have impact outside the transport space, with influences ranging 
from those on urban form to housing density and location of employment centers. As 
stated in the earlier section, substantial research in a few areas would be valuable. 
Defining the difference in travel time value for different modes is the first, and perhaps 
most important area. The NZTA recently discarded differential travel time values, but 
there is ample evidence that they should be different. By what degree they are different is 
where further research should be targeted. Additionally, determining the value of 
offsetting benefits for different modes like cycling and public transport (which serve to 
reduce the cost of travel time compared to that for driving) in the New Zealand context 
would be helpful. Additionally, more research would be useful into the psychosocial 
benefits of car ownership.  
 
Section 6.03 Automobile Ownership Costs 
 Compared to the other categories, this is a more challenging area to evaluate. It is 
not a flaw in the existing manual’s methods, but an important oversight to exclude from 
initial evaluations. Given the ease with which it can be calculated and that currently the 
cost of any alternative investment is considered, it makes sense to pit those new costs 
against existing costs to serve the same population. In the case of the Spine Study, 
excluding this element from the calculation of benefits leaves around 5% of the benefits 
out of the analysis for BRT, a number that balloons to around 20% of the benefits for 
light rail. To ensure an apples-to-apples comparison when looking at transport 
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improvements, the cost savings related to vehicle operation on a private basis should be 
included and weighed against the alternative. 
 Ridership changes are heavily undervalued in initial analyses and, while not as 
influential as the discount rate or travel time, still contribute meaningfully when 
evaluating transport projects. It is particularly unfortunate that these are not calculated 
when relatively complex work has gone into calculating the precise value of car operation 
costs in the Economic Evaluation Manual.  
Section 6.04 Community Severance Effect 
 The community severance effect in this analysis is not to be ignored, but it seems 
to be rendered relatively insignificant in comparison to the other overall influences when 
it comes to public transport. The $8.6 million community severance represents less than 
.5% of the total benefits in the case of light rail. In the case of BRT, the influence is so 
small as to be considered moot. This isn’t to diminish the value of severance in general, 
but in the case of public transport projects that result in large modal shifts, such as the 
Spine Study, severance may not be a meaningful contributor to the costs and benefits. On 
the other hand, severance would likely be very significant in the case of new roading 
projects with high capacity. As a result, the finding is not that severance should be 
ignored by the EEM, but rather that it should take a backseat role in the case of public 
transport investments.  
 Severance is an area ripe for new research, particularly with the upcoming 
construction of large in Auckland transport projects. The impact of urban form, housing 
density, car throughput, and road width would all provide interesting fodder for academic 
research. Given the Auckland urban form, and the roads planned relatively near the 
center city, it seems the perfect situation to analyze severance effects and come up with 
precise values. 
Section 6.05 Property Value Uplift 
 The property value uplift suggested by international review provides a solid 
checking value for urban rail projects to determine if existing analysis has done an 
adequate job of determining the benefits available. Though the total calculated benefits 
from the areas near light rail stations calculated in this study amount to roughly 58% of 
the total benefits projected to accrue for the system by land capitalization, the reality is 
that the itemized benefits we examine exclude many benefits – like those that accrue to 
businesses near stations as spending shifts from automotive operating costs to these shops. 
It also excludes basics like fares. Additionally, potentially new spending rather than just 
spending shifts are created due to increased time spent walking around these shops. 
Checking values when investing in light rail against these globally calculated 
capitalization values is good practice to determine whether or not analysis is relatively 
accurate, particularly when bringing modes as yet unseen to a country.  
 More important is the concurrence or lack thereof of property value uplift 
anticipated and calculated benefits. The clearest issue here is the disconnect between 
anticipated property value increase in the Spine Study and anticipated benefits 
calculation using current New Zealand methods. For either calculation method of 
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property value, the new benefit methods are clearly more consistent with the capitalized 
land values.  
 Perhaps more importantly, the calculated benefits in the option with SH1 
improvements match well with the 8% property value uplift method. Additionally, if 
accounting for the fact that they are individual accrual of benefits only – and exclude 
some benefits like retail sales – it is reasonable to posit that the missing benefits could 
make up the gap between the option and the more accurate property value analysis 
accounting for residential and commercial property. 
 Interestingly, the no improvements option far exceeds the projected property 
value increase, suggesting that with such an option it may be realistic to expect 
Wellington would be shifted into a category where far more in the way of property value 
increases occur. For example, Perth’s recent installation of a northern railway saw 
property values increase as much as 41% (Newman, 2013). Such increases are not 
unrealistic when accounting for additional dwelling units per hectare that are possible 
surrounding such a route.  
Section 6.06 Ridership and Congestion Times 
 An influential area in this analysis is the corrections to the Spine Study ridership 
and congestion times. Increasing the value by 30 times of the light rail benefits calls into 
question the inputs used for modeling the Spine Study ridership, given the international 
basis on which this paper has based it’s analysis. The impact clearly can’t be overstated, 
but the strong research indicating LRT will outperform BRT in almost any situation is 
hard to deny. With the inclusion of light rail, the city can expect that by 2043 there is 
virtually no congestion through the Basin Reserve. 
Chapter VII. Conclusions 
 A trio of relatively minor changes to the Economic Evaluation Manual would 
result in better evaluation in separate cases. Cycling projects would have better isolation 
of health benefits and safety, new roads would better account for the severing of 
communities, and preliminary exploration of automobile ownership would additionally 
help create a more direct comparison between the operating costs to the economy of a 
public transport system versus private vehicles. But these changes are not even the most 
significant ones needed. The central figures in the EEM’s flaws are those applied to the 
Spine Study in this paper’s examination. The huge effects in question warrant addressing 
on an immediate basis. 
 It is evident from the magnitude of effect that a change in the discounting regime 
needs to be undertaken. Including evidence endorsed by the OECD and other OECD 
countries, standards in practice for more than a decade, is a logical step. New Zealand 
leadership deserves to be provided a scope of evidence that includes official OECD 
guidance and these best practices.  
Transport decisions in particular are hamstrung by the existing regime, with 
results that are evident to the residents of the cities – with Auckland riddled with 
congestion and Wellington craving a proper public transport spine. Given the near 
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doubling of benefits an appropriate discount rate indicates, even over the discount rate 
just adopted in July 2013, it is clear that New Zealand can’t afford an oversight on best 
practices in this area any longer. Gollier’s modelling that indicates declining discount 
rates are the weapon of choice for transport economists is compelling. Combined with the 
modeling by Weitzman indicating that the least limiting discount factor (leading to lower 
discount rates) should be used, this leads to the inexorable conclusion that the discount 
regime in New Zealand need adopt lower, certainty-equivalent discount rates (even lower 
than the rates adopted in the most recent July 2013 review) and that those rates should 
decline over the long term. That said, there is nothing preventing the inclusion of the 
older, financially focused discounting terms for the sake of those who prefer them. 
Balanced evidence that political entities can dissect on their own is not problematic for 
advice-oriented organizations. 
 Equally desperate is the need for accurate evaluation of the value of travel times. 
Sampling error and perceptual errors when evaluating what travel time is worth via 
survey is a well-known issue. So much so that in the Spine Study, they acknowledge 
perceptual errors and adjust times waiting for transfers to be more punitive. Revealed 
preference is the ideal method to determine the value of commuting travel time, and 
though the studies using it to determine such are limited, they are nonetheless valuable to 
consider. Stated preference is by far the easiest information to collect, as it can be sought 
by a broader cadre of researchers. That said, revealed preference is preferable for its 
accuracy, and this targets potential future research towards social scientists.  
On the face of it, this is important in two ways. The first is that waiting time and 
congestion time should be costed out at the same price as travel time. Currently, 
congestion time vastly underrates the value of that commuter’s time because not only is 
the value used far too low, but the value is applied on a per-vehicle rather than per-
individual basis. These aspects combine to create an implication that congestion is 
effectively irrelevant, and spending money to alleviate it is unjustified. For this first issue, 
any commuter can tell you the opposite is the reality of the situation.  
Perhaps more important is the effect on the nature of transport investments 
selected. The potential change in value indicates that in lieu of investments that increase 
road capacity (and thus induce demand, often making congestion worse further into the 
network, though the net number of road users increases), appropriate travel time analysis 
leads to more investments that manage demand, investments in alternate modes that are 
less capital-intense to the economy than private vehicles, and all-in-all produce benefits 
that are seen not just early on after the investment is made, but well into the distant 
future. Studies using revealed preference and urban tolls conducted in New Zealand 
could determine the value of travel time here to a precise level (and compliment the 
existing hedonic price research conducted in the Wellington region that concurs with the 
changed value), but for now the values relative to prevailing wage determined by the 
international literature can be employed in their stead to fix this pressing issue.  
As with travel times, there is a lack of deep revealed preference or hedonic New 
Zealand research on the effect of rail development on home prices. Most rail in New 
Zealand dates from an era long before such research was conducted, and thus 
international research needs to be incorporated to create a verification method for 
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explorations such as the Spine Study that include new modes. Urban rail in particular is 
under scrutiny in all three major New Zaland cities in a way that demands accurate 
analysis, and suggests that modelling should be important for potential bus and car 
options, but international research should be consulted to verify that the modelling is 
yielding results that make sense. Ample research exists to indicate that land value uplift is 
created when urban rail is installed, reflecting the total benefits created by such a system. 
By comparing the modeled benefits with a highly conservative anticipated increase in 
land value, this paper can ensure that these investments are analyzed with some sort of 
discipline in order to supply decision makers with the best possible evidence.  
New Zealand has the capacity to produce the best evidence, and the research 
institutions that, in conjunction with government, have the capability to verify all of these 
aspects in the New Zealand context. Such changes do have broad implications, but they 
are largely ones that comport with recent research completed in New Zealand that 
indicates high value of time  (Pettit et al., 2013) and research that indicates more people 
would like to take public transport  (Betanzo, 2013). These studies combined with 
international research result in one overarching conclusion that requires change to New 
Zealand’s analysis context. The reality is, taking all of these facts in sum, that New 
Zealand is currently lagging best practice by 5 or 10 years when it comes to transport 
analysis as a result of infrequent review. The changes in this paper would reduce most of 
the error in New Zealand cost-benefit analysis. This would yield better information for 
decision makers, better projects getting funded, better options for ratepayers, and better 
long-term outcomes for New Zealand.  
International Implications 
The implications for this analysis extend beyond the borders of New Zealand. It is 
common to see surprisingly low benefit-cost ratios for most forms of rail in cities that have 
major transportation challenges. If small cities like Wellington are economically viable for 
light rail, it calls into question the cost structures, routing, and Cost-Benefit Analysis tools 
employed in those cities. Of course, each city is unique and transport challenges are more 
varied the larger a city gets, but the economies of scale influencing the value of public 
transport is quite pronounced as a city gets larger.  
Taking the analysis above as a best practice for the six areas defined would result 
in different conclusions in what the most economically efficient, most cost-effective, and 
thusly the first investments that should be made for a city of any size. Further research 
into each area, with a partiality for revealed preference data on value, and a preference 
for meta-analyses with issues like ridership and capital increase, should be pursued in any 
country that is interested in improving the economic efficiency of transport investment. 
Until such research is undertaken, the tools analyzed above provide guidance on 
adjustments based on prevailing wages, existing property values, and per-km values.
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A – Congestion Times 
 In order to generate congestion times, a variety of issues need to be taken into 
account. Capacities, assumptions and information were derived from existing data from 
WCC, NZTA and GWRC to arrive at the following basis for analysis–  
• Mt. Vic Tunnel is already overcapacity.  (NZTA, 2012a) 
• Around 4,821 cars per peak hour passed through the Basin in 2009. Currently, 
parts of the Basin (namely the Mt. Victoria Tunnel) are at capacity, while the 
entire system will reach capacity by 2021 –  (Opus Consulting, 2013a; Wellington 
City Council, 2013).  
• A 2nd Mt. Victoria tunnel would add around 1,400 cars per hour capacity in each 
direction, as the tunnel is already overcapacity (Opus assumes 1600 but 
contradicts itself in that way) (Opus Consulting, 2013a, 2013b).  
• A 2nd Mt. Victoria tunnel would have the potential to induce demand over ten 
years up to 40% over and above existing demand for the tunnel portion of the trip 
(Goodwin, 1996). 
• A flyover at the Basin would reduce demand for the Basin from the tunnel by 
around 1100 cars per hour up to its capacity of 3800 cars per hour. This 
presumption implies that the congestion wont appear downstream, but that is very 
unlikely (Opus Consulting, 2013b). 
• Congestion in general does not occur until around 70% of a roadway’s capacity is 
reached, scaling from there (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010).  
• Current congestion can be modeled as around 97% of the capacity of the 
roadways in the area (NZTA, 2012a, 2012b; Opus Consulting, 2013a, 2013b; 
Wellington City Council, 2013). 
• Without improvement, Basin travel times will increase by around 75% by 2021 
(NZTA, 2012b). 
• Congestion is modeled assuming the flyover and 2nd Tunnel will be built.  
• This is a conservative assessment for congestion because it does not account for 
the reality that even massively improving the basin individually, the roads on 
either side of this single point on the network will remain the same size from a 
capacity perspective. The likely net effect would be shifting the congestion 
downtown rather than solving the congestion issue. Opus consulting reports 
indicate this. Vivian Street is a notable place where the capacity will be exceeded 
before the Basin’s completion. This is also conservative because it does not 
consider congestion outside of the Basin Reserve interchange – e.g. along 
Lambton Quay.  
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• Finally, congestion times never exceed 20 minutes. Such times would inspire 
massive modal shifts unlike any ever seen in Wellington before. It would like 
inspire more walking and cycling from further distance, more buses to be 
provided by Metlink, shifts in route to places like Happy Valley and Evans Bay 
Parade, more Scooter purchases, and other avenues that are not deemed as 
practical now. 
Appendix B – Congestion Times without Flyover & 2nd Tunnel 
 In the main body, congestion times were generated presuming the construction of 
both the flyover and a 2nd Mount Victoria tunnel. Below are congestion times generated 
presuming neither are constructed: 
Table A-0-1 Congestion Times without a Flyover or 2nd Tunnel 
Congestion Times (minutes) through Basin - No SH1 Flyover/Duplicate Tunnel 
Year Bus (Base Case) BRT LIGHT RAIL 
2013 10.25 10.25 10.25 
2014 11.00 11.00 11.00 
2015 11.75 11.75 11.75 
2016 12.50 12.50 12.50 
2017 13.25 13.25 13.25 
2018 14.00 14.00 14.00 
2019 14.75 14.75 14.75 
2020 15.50 15.50 15.50 
2021 
 (Operational) 
16.25 10.22 4.76 
2022 17.00 10.80 4.45 
2023 17.75 11.38 4.13 
2024 18.50 11.95 3.82 
2025 19.25 12.53 3.50 
2026 20.00 13.11 3.19 
2027 20.00 13.69 2.87 
2028 20.00 14.26 2.69 
2029 20.00 14.84 2.51 
2030 20.00 15.42 2.33 
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2031 20.00 16.00 2.40 
2032 20.00 16.57 2.24 
2033 20.00 17.15 2.07 
2034 20.00 17.73 1.91 
2035 20.00 18.30 1.75 
2036 20.00 18.88 1.59 
2037 20.00 19.46 1.42 
2038 20.00 20.00 1.26 
2039 20.00 20.00 1.10 
2040 20.00 20.00 0.93 
2041 20.00 20.00 0.41 
2042 20.00 20.00 0.23 
2043 20.00 20.00 0.05 
See Appendix A for assumptions and basis. 
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Appendix C – Costs and Benefits with No SH1 Improvements 
This section consists of the benefits given corrected values for costs based on this paper’s 
review of literature, in addition to both corrected ridership and congestion analysis based 
on the same. It also presumes the flyover and duplicate Mt. Victoria tunnel are not 
constructed. Confidence in these findings are somewhat lower and so they are left to the 
appendix.  
Table A0-2 Costs and Benefits (in Millions) with Corrected Data/Values – No SH1 
Improvements 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 
 
203 3,347 
Time Savings for Other Drivers 
 
1,318 8,525 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 
 
27 402 
Cost of Community Severance 
 
.581 8.645 
Total Benefits, Discounted 140 1,968 
Total benefits, Including other drivers 
(Discounted) 1,097 6,867 
 
  
 
Appendix D – Perturbation Analysis 
 Due to the various presumptions, based on literature, used to create this analysis, 
it is worthwhile to undertake a perturbation analysis of a few of the most critical 
components: Congestion Times, the Value of Time, and Ridership. In order to do so, this 
paper will reduce each assumption’s added value by 20% and establish the kind of 
difference that would make to our optimized model’s value.  
Table A-0-3 Costs and Benefits (in Millions) -  Perturbed Value of Time 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 152 1,415 
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Time Savings for Other Drivers 
 
465 1,357 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 
 
27 402 
Cost of Community Severance 
 
.581 8.6 
Total Benefits, Discounted 102 942 
Total benefits, Including other drivers 
(Discounted) 334 1,605 
 
  
The bottom line here is that a 20% reduction in the predicted value of time results in a 
22%  reduction in the value of BRT time savings, versus 18% reduction for light rail time 
savings. This indicates a strong effect on the overall outcome of this paper. That said this 
parameter can be accurately estimated due to the revealed preference nature of the data 
employed. It is based on both US and New Zealand data that extrapolate out the value of 
time from the actual behavior of commuters (in toll paying and house prices) rather than 
survey-based data that is subject to perceptual error. The precision of such revealed 
preference data is far better in the case of an issue like value of time. 
 
Table A-0-4 Costs and Benefits (in Millions) -  Perturbed Congestion 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 
 
185 1,666 
Time Savings for Other Drivers 
 
465 1,357 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 
 
27 402 
Cost of Community Severance 
 
.581 8.6 
Total Benefits, Discounted 122 1,075 
	   VII—63	  
Total benefits, Including other drivers 
(Discounted) 353 1,738 
   
 
A 20% reduction in the congestion times predicted results in a 18% reduction in BRT 
benefits, and a 12% reduction in LRT benefits. This implies that modeling of congestion 
is a critical task, but slightly less important than travel time value. However – it is notable 
that existing Opus consulting reports on the Basin Reserve indicate that road’s capacity 
will be exceeded by 2021 for all stages – and as such a second tunnel and flyover will not 
help without massive roading upgrades elsewhere in that area. As a result, these 
congestion times can be estimated accurately given the arterial it serves passes through 
that highly congested zone. Even so, estimates of congestion are likely underestimated 
due to the fact that the Basin is but one congested bottleneck along a series of them, and a 
series of them that will become bottlenecks, in the downtown.  
 
Table A-0-5 Costs and Benefits (in Millions) -  Perturbed Ridership Growth 
Cost or Benefit Type Bus Rapid Transit Light Rail 
Time Savings for Riders 
 
190 1,297 
Time Savings for Other Drivers 
 
581 1,597 
Cost of Auto Ownership Savings 
 
27 285 
Cost of Community Severance 
 
.581 .6133 
Total Benefits, Discounted 124 816 
Total benefits, Including other drivers 
(Discounted) 413 1,596 
   
 
A 20% reduction in the ridership growth rate predicted (applied only to light rail, as BRT 
numbers are not generated) results in a 19% reduction in the value of light rail benefits. 
This indicates that while the numbers are important to the analysis, the overall growth 
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rate of light rail is about equal in importance to other areas. The high confidence gained 
from reviews of recent installations and long-term studies, aligned with long-term trends 
both nationally and internationally, combined with this minimal impact, lend this area a 
particular confidence. If any issue might compromise this ridership, it is form-related 
issues about the installation that drive an excess of transfers. This paper does not concern 
itself with these issues, though they would be easily solved by extension or modification of 
the plan.  
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Appendix E – Cost Structure When Discounted 
 As indicated in the discounting section of this literature review, any new declining 
and lower regime of discounting would need to include discounting payments made 
against financing instead of the resource costs of a project when incurred. This is to 
ensure that risk and financing cost is adequately accounted for within the payments 
structure of a cost-benefit analysis. For this payment, this paper uses a discount rate as 
stated above, and an interest rate of 5.9% for GWRC, or 4.27% for NZTA, from 10 year 
government bond rates reported by RBNZ.  
The following costings presume bonds were issued in 2018, principal and interest are 
repayed throughout similar to a typical loan. The payment structure for a light rail 
installation using the costs indicated in the Spine Study is below (using 2018 as the base 
year for discounting): 
Table A-0-6 10 Year Bond Cost Structure – Interest + Social Discounting Applied 
Year GWRC  (Millions of $) NZTA  
Type Undiscounted Discounted Undiscounted Discounted 
2018 $124.6 $121.0 $115.6 $112.2 
2019 $124.6 $117.5 $115.6 $109.0 
2020 $124.6 $114.0 $115.6 $105.8 
2021 $124.6 $110.7 $115.6 $102.7 
2022 $124.6 $107.5 $115.6 $99.7 
2023 $124.6 $104.4 $115.6 $96.8 
2024 $124.6 $101.3 $115.6 $94.0 
2025 $124.6 $98.4 $115.6 $91.3 
2026 $124.6 $95.5 $115.6 $88.6 
2027 $124.6 $92.7 $115.6 $86.0 
Total $1,246.6 $1,063.4 $1,156.5 $986.5 
 
Appendix F – Financial Recovery 
 On an annual basis the financial recoveries will actually be quite high for such a 
system. Seen below is a schedule of annual recoveries including farebox recovery 
presuming a monthly pass sold at $90 and rates generated by the scenarios indicated in 
the Spine Study assuming inflation of 3% and no increase in house prices in excess of this. 
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This neglects the additional tax from retail business increasing as well as the savings from 
interest servicing on roading projects. All numbers are in Millions. 
Table A-0-7 Financial Recoveries and Costs  
Year Rates Farebox Total Financial 
Recovery 
Costs 
Type Discounted Discounted Discounted Discounted 
2018    112.2 
2019    109.0 
2020    105.8 
2021 7.3 25.7 33.1 102.7 
2022 7.3 26.1 33.4 99.7 
2023 7.3 26.5 33.7 96.8 
2024 7.2 26.8 34.0 94.0 
2025 7.2 27.1 34.3 91.3 
2026 7.1 27.4 34.5 88.6 
2027 7.0 27.7 34.7 86.0 
2028 7.0 27.8 34.8  
2029 6.9 27.9 34.8  
2030 6.9 28.0 34.9  
2031 6.8 27.0 33.7  
2032 6.7 27.0 33.8  
2033 6.6 27.1 33.7  
2034 6.6 27.2 33.7  
2035 6.5 27.2 33.7  
2036 6.4 27.2 33.6  
2037 6.3 27.2 33.6  
2038 6.3 27.2 33.5  
2039 6.2 27.2 33.4  
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2040 6.1 27.2 33.3  
2041 6.0 28.1 34.1  
2042 7.3 25.7 33.1  
2043 7.3 26.1 33.4  
Total 712.3 986.5 
 
Appendix G - Realistic Cost Structures 
 There is one issue that overarches the evaluation of this light rail line. The costs 
proposed in the PTSS are grossly overestimated based on a combination of 
overspecification and poorly imagined routing. Routes based on best practice and highest 
economic efficiency would send a dual-track tram up Constable St, and redirect one lane 
of traffic through one of the neighborhoods adjoining the hospital at the expense of 
parking. This would yield two one-way car routes and a dual light rail track. Such a route 
would eliminate the need for an expensive tunnel and cut off 4km of track, savings of 
$540 million or more  (AECOM, 2013). The PTSS costs are consistent with global 
evidence on a per-km basis. That said, the chosen routes severely damage their economic 
efficiency. For the purpose of the next section, this paper infers from prior evidence that 
the cost of an economically efficient system would be roughly $400 million. 
Appendix H - Benefit-Cost Ratios 
 The Benefit-Cost Ratios for BRT in an environment with SH1 improvements 
increases to 2.05 with the employment of these tools. This is an assessment of the value of 
a BRT system built to international standards. The current one will struggle to meet even 
the bronze certification per the BRT Standard Version 1.0 (Institute for Transportation 
Development Policy, 2012).  
 From a fiscal perspective alone the light rail project, commencing in 2018 and 
operating from 2021 would have a Benefit-Cost Ratio of .75 even if restricted to these 
benefits. This is the worst imaginable situation for the light rail – restricting it to financial 
benefits only, using the minimal capital increase value, the highest cost, and ignoring 
potentially the most substantial benefits. Given the corrected benefits calculated early in 
this paper, using the higher cost structures and financial repayment estimates above, and 
doing a 30 year analysis the BCR grows to 2.85.   
The benefits can also be analyzed against an economically efficient route costing 
$400 million. In such a situation the light rail BCR increases to 6.69.  
